In recent years, several dynamic identity-based two-factor user authentication using password and smartcard have been proposed to provide mutual authentication between the user and server over unreliable networks. However, the design of secure cryptographic schemes is still notoriously hard, and there have been several instances of detected flaws in published schemes. For example in 2010, Hao and Yu demonstrated that Wang et al.'s user authentication scheme is insecure against off-line password guessing and server masquerade attacks, and proposed an improved scheme. Subsequently in 2012, Chao pointed out that the improved scheme of Hao and Yu is, unfortunately, susceptible to off-line password guessing and server masquerade attacks, and prone to password backward security problem; and proposed an enhanced scheme. In this paper, we demonstrated that Chao's enhanced scheme is not secure against user masquerade attack, server masquerade attack, insider attack and off-line password guessing attack in violation of its security claim as well as it fails to achieve users' anonymity.
Introduction
As the Internet evolves from an academic and research network into a commercial network, more and more organizations and individuals are connecting their internal networks and computers to the Internet. Investment in network expansion by telecommunications companies will see a further expansion in capacity that will result in an increase in bandwidth availability and greater adoption of wireless and mobile technologies. As businesses continue to engage in electronic commerce, they will become increasingly globalised and interconnected. These, and other developments, create not only benefits for the community, but also risks of cybercrime [1] . Cybercriminals, for example, aim to disrupt one or more combinations of the following security notions: data confidentiality, data integrity and data availability. The ability to provide security guarantees is of paramount importance and several initiatives have been proposed to address this concern. Due to the low computation cost and portability of smartcard and easy memorization of user chosen password, two-factor smartcard authentication [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] using password is commonly used in Internet-based applications such as remote user/server login, online banking, Pay-TV, electronic voting, secret online order placement.
In recent years, several smartcard based password authentication schemes have been published. For example in 2002, Chien et al. [2] proposed one such scheme, but was subsequently found to be vulnerable to reflection and insider attacks [3] . To remove these drawbacks, Ku and Chen [3] designed another improved scheme, but Wang et al. [4] demonstrated that the scheme is insecure against off-line password guessing attack, forgery attack and denial of service (DoS) attack, and proposed another improved scheme. However, Chung et al. [5] revealed that Wang et al.'s scheme [2] is still susceptible to impersonation attack and off-line password guessing attack. In addition, Wang et al.'s scheme is not easily repairable and is unable to provide perfect forward secrecy of the generated session key. Other instances of vulnerabilities in published smartcard-based password authentication schemes include off-line password guessing attack [6] [7] [8] 22] , impersonation attack [9] [10] [11] , forgery attack [4, [12] [13] [14] , DoS attack [4, 7, 18, 23] , parallel session attack [4, 9, 10, 18] , replay attack [23] , stolen/lost smartcard attack [9, 22, 24] , observing power consumption [25] and reverse engineering techniques [26, 27] .
In this paper, we examine the protocol of Chao [16] whose history is as follows. In 2010, Hao and Yu [17] pointed out that Wang et al.'s scheme [6] is not secure against off-line password guessing attack and server masquerade attack, and proposed an enhanced scheme. Unfortunately, Chao [16] demonstrated that Hao and Yu's scheme [17] is still insecure against off-line password guessing attack and server masquerade attack, and prone to password backward security problem i.e., the scheme must be replaced if the scheme was attacked for one time, in violation of its security claims.
They then designed an improved ID-based scheme. The latter scheme is examined in this paper where we pointed out that this scheme is not secure from insider attack, server masquerade attack and user masquerade attack and user's anonymity problem. Furthermore, the scheme is susceptible to off-line password guessing attacks in which an attacker exhaustively enumerates all possible passwords in an offline manner to find out the correct password on lost/stolen smartcard. Off-line password guessing attacks have been used by both criminals and law enforcement and digital forensics practitioners to enable access to password-protected data (e.g. on smart phones and portable devices based on RIM Black Berry and Apple iOS platforms).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the Chao's smartcard-based user authentication scheme [16] , and Section 3 outlines our attacks. The last section concludes the paper.
Review of Chao's smartcard-based user authentication scheme
The Chao's scheme consists of four phases: registration phase, login phase, verification phase and password change phase, and the notations used are listed in Table 1 . 
Registration phase
This phase is executed between user U i and the remote server S, and consists of the following steps:
Step 1. U i chooses an identity-password pair (ID i , PW i ) and then sends it to S through a secure channel.
Step 2. On receiving (ID i , PW i ), S checks the identity ID i of U i , selects a random number r i and computes
Step 3. S issues a smartcard and writes the parameters
Then S sent the smartcard to U i through a secure channel.
Login phase
In order to login to the remote server S, U i inserts his smartcard into a card reader and inputs ID i and PW i , then the smartcard performs the followings:
Step 1. The smartcard computes h(x r i )
and
with L i and continues to the next step if they are equal, otherwise rejects the login request.
Step 2. The smartcard then computes
and sends the login message
through an open channel, where T i is the current timestamp of U i .
Verification phase
Assume that S received the message
and then S does the followings:
Step 1. S checks whether
Otherwise, S proceeds to the next step.
Step 2. S computes 
Password change phase
This phase allows U i to change his old password PW i to a new password PW * i with the following operations:
Step 1. U i inserts his smartcard into the card reader and inputs ID i and PW i , then the smartcard computes h(x r i ) (ID i h(x r i ) ′ ), and compares L ′ i with L i for valid password change operation. If they are not equal, the smartcard rejects the password change request and asks U i for exact PW i and ID i . Otherwise, the smartcard proceeds to the next step.
Step 2. Smartcard computes
The secure password change phase is finished.
Cryptanalysis of Chao's smartcard-based user authentication scheme
This section demonstrated that Chao's authentication scheme [16] is vulnerable to insider attack, user masquerade attack, server masquerade attack and off-line password guessing attack, as well as it fails to achieve users' anonymity. Before introducing the proposed attacks, we describe the following widely used assumptions about the power of an adversary A [10, 11, 15, 18, 22, 28, 29] . (A1) A can sniff the communication media through which U i and S communicate with each other i.e., A can intercept, block, inject, remove, or modify, any messages transmitted in the media. (A2) A may either (a) steal user's smartcard and extract the stored secrets by monitoring the timing information, power consumption and reverse engineering techniques as mentioned in [25] [26] [27] and guess the user's password in off-line manner using the secrets extracted from the smartcard; or (b) obtain a user's password directly by some means. However, the adversary is not allowed to do both (a) and (b) as having the smartcard and knowing the password would be trivial to impersonate the legitimate user.
Users' anonymity problem
In recent years, many dynamic identity-based remote login schemes [6, [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] have been proposed to provide mutual authentication between the user and the remote server. In any dynamic identity-based remote login scheme, users' anonymity [6, 7, 22] is an important security requirement. Now, we show that Chao's scheme [16] fails to achieve the same as follows: 
User masquerade attack
We now demonstrate that Chao's scheme [16] is not secure against user masquerade attack. 
and computes
With these successful verifications, S accepts the forged login request and allows A to login to S. Thus, A impersonates the valid user U i .
Server masquerade attack
This section demonstrated that Chao's user scheme [16] is vulnerable to server masquerade attack. 
Off-line password guessing attack
Assume that if the smartcard of U i is lost/stolen and it is in the physical possession of A , who then extracts the original contents (K i , L i , h(·)) by monitoring their timing information [25] , power consumption and reverse engineering techniques [26, 27] , where (ID i h(x r i ) ). Also we suppose that A monitors the communication channel and recovers U i 's valid login message 
Insider attack
Studies have demonstrated that users tend to use the same password for different applications [4, 19] . If the adversary, A , is a malicious insider of the remote server S and has learned U i 's password (a trivial exercise as U i sends his (ID i , PW i ) in plaintext form to S during the registration phase of Chao's scheme [16] ), A may try to masquerade the user U i using the password PW i to access other servers.
Conclusion
We examined the identity-based smartcard-based remote password authentication scheme of Chao (2012) , and demonstrated that the scheme is susceptible to common attacks, namely user masquerade attack, server masquerade attack, insider attack and off-line password guessing attack.
